Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

The so-called Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro uses words to conceal rather than reveal. For instance, it grandly declares: “The relationship of the Central Government with the Bangsamoro Government shall be asymmetric.” Asymmetric basically means they’re not equals, “hindi pantay,” but it doesn’t say who is subordinate to whom. If the intention was to say that the Bangsamoro Government is a subordinate political subdivision of the national government—as it should be, no two ways about that—that should’ve been stated. Here the fudge word is “asymmetric,” which creates an ambiguity that can be a fresh source of conflict in the future.

Second, the Agreement says: “The Bangsamoro shall have competence over the Shari’ah justice system.” Whatever happened to the Supreme Court’s power to regulate inferior courts? Here the fudge word is “competence,” as if that is cured by the executive branch bargaining away the high court’s exclusive power and sharing it with this new entity called Bangsamoro.

The third fudge word is “core territory.” The Constitution uses the term “territorial jurisdiction,” while the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao refers to the “area of autonomy.” Why add a new term to the lexicon of self-determination? If there is a “core” territory, there’s got to be a penumbral emanation from that core. It means that the Agreement expanded the ARMM area but that is just the start. Worse, it does not secure the borders equally for both the central and Bangsamoro governments. It’s one-sided. It secures the irreducible “core” in favor of the Bangsamoro, which can expand its scope against the central government. This is most worrisome, especially if seen side by side with that other fudge word, “asymmetrical.”

Finally, the negotiators say that the Agreement doesn’t require Charter change. Yet the Agreement includes clauses that the Supreme Court has already rejected in its 2008 decision on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel). For instance, the Court struck down in 2008 the term Bangsamoro identity, and yet the 2012 pact uses that same term in almost the same way. Moreover, the full text of the Agreement has not been made public. Critical annexes on “Power Sharing” and “Wealth Sharing” are still unavailable, as far as I know. That similar issue of lack of transparency was similarly raised in 2008.

source:  Philippine Daily Inquirer Column of by Atty Raul C. Pangalangan

SC: President Can Appoint CJ; JBC Can be Headed by Most Senior Justice

sc.judiciary.gov.ph - The Supreme Court has dismissed the petition questioning the President’s constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and arguing that only the incumbent Chief Justice can head the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

Citing Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Court stressed that the Constitution provides that “The members of the Supreme Court and the judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”

“A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly shows that the phrase ‘Members of the Supreme Court’ and the words ‘Members’ and ‘Member’ are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices,” ruled the Court in its seven-page resolution.

The Court also held that it does not agree with petition that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other.

The Court explained that the JBC’s principal function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionally named Chair could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.

The Court held that considering that the complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation. It ruled that the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: “In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the Chief Justice.”

In addition, the Court also found that petitioner Famela Dulay is wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition as she did not explain her capacity in instituting the petition whether as citizen or taxpayer filing on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issues.  (Extended Res., GR No. 202143, Dulay v. JBC, July 3, 2012)

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