Macalintal says Pacquiao is not yet qualified to run for the vice presidential post in 2016

Filipino boxing icon and Sarangani Rep. Manny Pacquiao is not yet qualified to run for the vice presidential post in the 2016 elections because of the age requirement.

Noted election lawyer Romulo Macalintal said that Pacquiao, who is reportedly being considered as the running mate of Vice President Jejomar Binay in the coming national polls, will only be 38 years old in 2016.

“Having been born on December 17, 1978, Pacquiao will only be 38 years old in 2016. Clearly, he is not yet qualified to run for vice president or to be the running mate of Binay in 2016,” Macalintal said in a statement.

Section 3, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that a candidate for president or vice president must be at least 40 years of age on the day of the election.

Speculations on the Binay-Pacquiao tandem in the next elections floated after Pacquiao welcomed Binay in General Santos City when the latter visited the province to oversee the government’s housing projects last Monday.

But Macalintal noted that Pacquiao is qualified to run in the senatorial race.

“He is qualified to run for senator, where the age qualification is at least 35 years of age,” the lawyer said.

Section 3, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that a senatorial candidate must be 35 years of age on the day of the election.

Earlier, Binay already announced that Pacquiao will be included in his senatorial lineup in the 2016 polls. PNA

source:  Manila Times

Jardeleza removable only by impeachment – SC

A sitting justice of the Supreme Court (SC) like Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza can only be removed by impeachment.

This was the ruling of the SC en banc in a disbarment case filed against Jardeleza amid the filing of motion for reconsideration of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) questioning the recent SC ruling that Jardeleza should be included in the short list that paved way for his appointment.

The 15-man tribunal junked the disbarment case lodged against Jardeleza, contending that he is now an “impeachable officer.”

A resolution dated August 26, 2014, signed and promulgated by lawyer  Enriqueta Vidal, Clerk of Court of the SC en banc,  dismissed the complaint filed by lawyer Reynaldo Cortes against Jardeleza when he was the then- Solicitor General.

The High Court argued that in view of the appointment of Jardeleza as justice of the SC, he is now considered an impeachable officer under the 1987 Constitution.

This means that Jardeleza can only be removed from office via impeachment proceedings.

Cortes filed the disbarment case, citing Jardeleza’s alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he was still the Solicitor General.

His case supports Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno dropping Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees when he was applying as Associate Justice of the SC.

Cortez filed an Opposition in Intervention in the SC by also questioning the integrity of Jardeleza as a lawyer.

Sereno and Associate Justice Antonio Carpio blocked the nomination of Jardeleza in connection with the “Itu Aba” property dispute in Taiwan and the Chief Justice  even raised an “immorality” issue against Jardeleza.

According to an SC insider who talked to The Manila Times on condition of anonymity, this ruling of the High Court will be echoed in the motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC against Jardeleza.

The source said it was only Sereno who cannot accept that Jardeleza is now in the SC.

“The move to attack Jardeleza again is an exercise in futility… because everybody in the court knows that it will be moot and academic,” the SC source added.

With a vote of 7 against 4, the SC granted a petition of then Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza to be included in the shortlist of nominees for a vacant post in the tribunal.

The seven justices who granted the petition of Jardeleza believed that Sereno and the JBC deprived Jardeleza of his right to due process by excluding his name from the shortlist despite his garnering the required majority vote.

source:  Manila Times

Stopping ISIS: What international law and the Pope have to say

THE OUTRAGE generated by ISIS’ atrocities effected unity of sorts among people of different persuasions. Except for the Left in the United States, which is incapable of grasping the notion that President Obama’s foreign policy is effete at best and likely nurtured ISIS’ rise, many are of the belief that the world’s governments should do something concrete to stop the terrorist onslaught. Right that sentiment may be, but in international law terms it’s easier said than done.

Which is ironic, as Pope Francis himself was reported to have approved of the air strikes against ISIS (more on that later). The legality, however, of the air strikes (or any military move by a foreign power) against ISIS is, believe it or not, questionable at this time.

Colum Lynch in a Foreign Policy piece correctly pointed out:

“International legal experts say the United States has an uphill battle convincing many of its allies that there is a legal rationale for extending strikes into Syria. The UN Charter offers two major paths to military action. A government is permitted, under Article 51, to use force against an armed aggressor in self-defense. It can also invite foreign powers to help it defend itself, as Iraq has done. The UN Security Council can, under Article 42, authorize a military intervention. But those roads may be blocked for the time being.

“The Syrian government has not approved American air power. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem warned that Bashar al-Assad’s regime would consider American military intervention in its territory an ‘act of aggression’ unless it coordinated its activities with Damascus -- a condition Washington has rejected. And Russia -- while no friend of the Islamic State -- may not be inclined to approve a Security Council resolution granting Washington a blank check in Syria.”

Ryan Goodman, on the other hand, stated:

“In conducting attacks against ISIS, the United States might assert either (1) the right of individual self-defense due to ISIS’ direct threat to the United States; or (2) the right of collective self-defense in coming to the aid of Iraq. At this point, the former is a weak one -- without a truly imminent or actual ‘armed attack’ against the United States. The latter is solid.

“But what about US forces crossing the border into Syria? The US government would likely assert that Syria is ‘unwilling or unable’ to deal effectively with the ISIS threat. This is the same prerogative that the United States invokes in other parts of the world (think: the US operation to kill Osama bin Laden without seeking Pakistan’s approval). The ‘unwilling or unable’ test is now a fairly well settled part of the US government’s legal position. Nevertheless, it remains controversial under international law.”

Regarding “collective self-defense” that Goodman indicated above, the same could be legally defensible but politically difficult. Considering the dynamics involved in Security Council votes, as well as Obama’s continuing inability to show leadership in this matter, for it to authorize actual military force is currently improbable.

As for the Pope himself agreeing to the use of force, what he actually said was aptly described by Think Progress as follows: “‘I can only say this: It is licit to stop the unjust aggressor,’ the pontiff said in reference to ISIS, according to CNN. ‘I underline the verb: stop. I do not say bomb, make war, I say stop by some means.’ ‘But we must also have memory,’ he added. ‘How many times under this excuse of stopping an unjust aggressor the powers [that intervened] have taken control of peoples, and have made a true war of conquest.’”

Indeed, under the teachings of the Church, military force may be morally permissible if “the following conditions are simultaneously present:

• the suffering inflicted by the aggressor must be lasting, grave and certain;

• all other peaceful means must have been shown to be ineffective;

• there are well-founded prospects of success;

• the use of arms, especially given the power of modern weapons of mass destruction, must not produce evils graver than the evil to be eliminated.”

And even then, “during a war the moral law always remains valid. It requires the humane treatment of noncombatants, wounded soldiers and prisoners of war. Deliberate actions contrary to the law of nations, and the orders that command such actions are crimes, which blind obedience does not excuse. Acts of mass destruction must be condemned and likewise the extermination of peoples or ethnic minorities, which are most grievous sins. One is morally bound to resist the orders that command such acts.”

Which just goes to show that, even in war, what is moral is not necessarily legal. And vice versa.

Jemy Gatdula specializes in international economic law (WTO and ASEAN), and teaches international law and legal philosophy at the UA&P School of Law and Governance.

jemygatdula@yahoo.com

www.jemygatdula.blogspot.com

A layman’s dangerous reading of SC’s definition of ‘capital’

IN Monday’s piece, Due Diligencer asked the Securities and Exchange Commission if it had fully complied with the order of the Supreme Court for it to review the foreign ownership of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.
Apparently, the high court recognized the competence of the SEC as the securities industry regulator that it tossed to its officials the sensitive task of penalizing PLDT for violating the 60-40 ownership rule between Filipinos and foreigners.

The penalty may be imposed only if the company is found in violation of the 60-40 rule in favor of Filipinos.

Since Due Diligencer failed to find anything either for or against PLDT that the SEC should have posted on its website, it is expanding its poser. This time, it wants to know if the SEC should also apply the SC’s ruling on PLDT ownership to other companies engaged in industries where Filipinos should own at least 60 percent of outstanding capital stock.

If the answer is yes, then why has the SEC, led by Chairperson Teresita J. Herbosa, not even made the first step in reviewing the ownership profiles of companies registered with it? The commission’s examiners, if the commissioners would allow them, may want to start with the ownership filings posted on the website of the Philippine Stock Exchange by publicly listed companies.

Of course, SEC officials may not agree with a layman’s reading of a court decision. Being lawyers, they may have different interpretation of a court decision that may be so full of legalese it is beyond this writer’s comprehension.

For example, the SEC’s five-man body may have a different interpretation of the SC’s ruling on the Gamboa-PLDT case that its members may not agree with this writer. But Due Diligencer has been rereading said decision too often that it could not forget a very intriguing portion that deals on the 60-percent minimum Filipino ownership.

“Thus, if a corporation, engaged in a partially nationalized industry, issues a mixture of common and preferred non-voting shares, at least 60 percent of the common shares and at least 60 percent of the preferred non-voting shares must be owned by Filipinos,” the SC said in its ruling written by Associate Justice Antonio Carpio.

Then the SC elaborated: “In short, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens must apply separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any other class of shares.”

The SC went on: “This uniform application of the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens clearly breathes life to the constitutional command that the ownership and operation of public utilities shall be reserved exclusively to corporations at least 60 percent of whose capital is Filipino-owned.

“Applying uniformly the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens to each class of shares, regardless of differences in voting rights, privileges and restrictions, guarantees effective Filipino control of public utilities, as mandated by the Constitution.”

By its ruling, the SC did not mean adding all the shares whether common or voting or non-voting preferred shares and dividing the total by the number of shares owned by Filipinos. If the quotient is less than 60 percent, then the ownership ratio of the company is in violation of the law.

To a layman, the SC simply means computing separately each class of shares in a company’s outstanding capital stock to determine if Filipinos control at least 60 percent of the common voting shares, 60 percent of the voting preferred shares and 60 percent of the non-voting preferred shares of public utilities.

Due Diligencer hopes it is wrong in concluding that the issuance of preferred shares would not effectively dilute the foreign ownership in a company to the legal limit of 40 percent. If it is right, then the SEC examiners who are underpaid and overworked may have to extend their working hours beyond eight hours in reviewing the ownership profiles of companies to see to it that foreigners should not own more than 40 percent of the outstanding capital of public utilities.
esdperez@gmail.com

source:  Manila Times

Grace Padaca being eased out of Comelec

PRESIDENT Benigno Aquino 3rd is no longer inclined to reappoint former Isabela governor Grace Padaca to the Commission on Elections (Comelec) after her confirmation, along with those of two other poll body officials, was bypassed by the powerful Commission on Appointments (CA) recently.
Padaca, according to an unimpeachable source of The Manila Times, is not likely to get another ad interim appointment from the President because she has pending cases at the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan.

“She failed to file her SALN [statement of assets liabilities and net worth] for three years when she was still governor. She has also a graft case,” the source said.

The Times tried to get the reaction of Presidential Communications Secretary Herminio Coloma Jr. and Malacañang spokesman Edwin Lacierda but the officials were mum on the issue. Coloma, in a text message, said he will have to verify Padaca’s status with the Office of the President.

Prior to the sine die adjournment of Congress, the CA did not act on the appointments of Padaca and Comelec Commissioners Louie Tito Guia and Al Parreño. Padaca’s term will only expire on February 2, 2018 because she is serving the remaining term of former Commissioner Augusto Lagman.
Parreño replaced Commissioner Rene Sarmiento while Guia replaced Armando Velasco.

The President will have to reappoint the officials, who will again be subjected to CA scrutiny in the next Congress.

Earlier this year, the Office of the Ombudsman asked the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the trial of Padaca, who is facing charges of malversation and graft.

The graft case stemmed from Padaca’s awarding of a P25-million grant to the Economic Development for Western Isabela and Northern Luzon Foundation Inc. that was disbursed without the concurrence or approval of the Isabela provincial board when she was Isabela governor.

Padaca entered a plea of not guilty on October 22, 2013. She had sought the dismissal of the charges claiming immunity from suit. Her lawyers said when Aquino appointed Padaca to the Comelec on October 2, 2012, she automatically enjoys the protection of Sections 2 and 3, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The provision states that she is already an impeachable officer and only the House of Representatives has the exclusive power to do that.

But Ombudsman prosecutors argued that the former governor cannot hide behind her supposed immunity because the criminal charges were filed before her appointment to the poll body.

The Sandiganbayan also argued that such immunity could lead to an “abuse of political power of appointment” to insulate public officials from liability.
 
source:  Manila Times

Government ‘stimulus’ unconstitutional -- SC

THE SUPREME COURT yesterday struck down “acts and practices” under the Aquino administration’s Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) for violating constitutional provisions on the transfer of appropriations and separation of powers.

With one justice abstaining, the high court “partially granted” petitions for review and prohibition questioning the DAP’s validity and its related executive issuances, particularly National Budget Circular 541.

Among the practices voided was the withdrawal of unobligated allotments from implementing agencies and declaring these, as well as unreleased appropriations, part of savings before the end of a fiscal year. The SC said this did not conform to the definition of savings under the General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The “cross-border” transfer of funds from the executive to other branches of government and the funding of projects not included in the GAA were likewise struck down.

“The Court further declares void the use of unprogrammed funds... for noncompliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriation Acts,” SC Spokesperson Theodore O. Te said in a briefing where he also announced that the high court had upheld the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law.

Mr. Te said the DAP, in particular, violated Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution stating that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

The DAP was a stimulus package designed to fast-track public spending and push economic growth. It was approved by President Benigno S. C. Aquino III on Oct. 12, 2011, with funds to be sourced and augmented out of “savings” generated during the year and additional revenue sources. A total of P83.53 billion was released under in 2011 and another P58.7 billion in 2012. The initiatives funded included P30 billion of the government’s required P50-billion equity infusion in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

The government, in its defense, said it was within the President’s power to spend and augment the budget, insisting that the DAP is a “fund management system” and not a “fund” as claimed by petitioners.

The high court’s Mr. Te sidestepped a question on Budget Secretary Florencio B. Abad’s liability as one of the main defendants, but a legal expert from the University of the Philippines-College of Law said Mr. Abad could face administrative sanctions.

“It amounts to malversation except there’s no element of whether or not Secretary Abad benefited from it. At the very least, there is an administrative liability,” UP professor Herminio Harry L. Roque said.

Mr. Abad, for his part, said in a text message: “I will reserve my comment until I read the full text of the SC decision.” The Budget department, meanwhile, said: “We will yield to the Office of the President to issue a statement on the SC decision on the DAP.”

Deputy Presidential Spokesperson Abigail F. Valte said the Palace was deferring comment pending receipt of the court ruling.

A copy of the decision written by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin was not made immediately available. Five other magistrates will likewise write separate opinions on the DAP’s constitutionality, namely Associate Justices Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Mario Victor F. Leonen, Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. del Castillo and Antonio T. Carpio.

A member of the 15-person tribunal, who asked not to be named for lack of authority to speak to the press, said in a text message that the ruling, which strikes down the four practices, “effectively covers the entire DAP.”

“[The] word ‘partially grant’ was used because other prayers of petitioners, like disclosure of documents, were not granted because they were moot,” the Justice said.

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, meanwhile, lauded the decision.

“It’s basically a no-brainer. The DAP is illegal because it was not contained in the 2011 or 2012 budgets, and because the alleged savings were used to augment new budget items which were not previously authorized by Congress,” she said in a statement.

Business groups, meanwhile, asked if the decision would affect the Aquino administration’s reform efforts.

Gregorio S. Navarro, Management Association of the Philippines president, said: “The SC has declared PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Fund) illegal, hence it would have been highly unusual not to likewise declare DAP illegal, at least partially so. The question is what next?”

Peter Angelo V. Perfecto, Makati Business Club executive director, who noted that the DAP had addressed the business sector’s concern over an infrastructure project slowdown, said the court ruling “will better guide our government in the prudent management and utilization of public resources.”

“We recall that DAP was the means by which government accelerated much needed infrastructure projects that had slowed down due to careful review by the Aquino administration of all projects in line with its policy of zero tolerance for corruption,” Mr. Perfecto said.

Nine petitions were filed questioning the DAP. These came from the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption; Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees; losing senatorial candidate Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica and two others; lawyer Manuelito R. Luna; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; Philippine Constitutional Association; Jose Malvar Villegas Jr.; militant leaders and party-list lawmakers; and former Iloilo Representative Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. -- Mikhail Franz E. Flores and Bettina Faye V. Roc with reports from Ailyn D. Galura and Daryll Edisonn D. Saclag

source:  Businessworld

SC: Aquino no authority to discipline Ombudsman

THE Supreme Court has ruled that the Office of the President has no authority to impose disciplinary action on the Ombudsman’s deputies, saying the administrative authority being exercised by the Executive on the deputy ombudsman is unconstitutional.

“The Court held that the Office of the President has no power of discipline over the office of the deputy ombudsman,” Supreme Court spokesman Theodore Te said.

He said that of the appointed officials in the Office of the Ombudsman, only the special prosecutor was covered by the Palace’s power of discipline.

But he failed to tell more about the high court decision and declined to name the justices who voted in favor of the ruling, saying some magistrates had said they intended to submit their respective separate concurring opinions.

The high tribunal made its ruling on the case of retiring Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices Emilio Gonzales III, the official who was dismissed from the service by the Palace over the bloody hostage-taking incident at the Luneta Park on Aug. 23, 2010.

The Court ruled on the constitutional issue on its own initiative because it was not raised in the motion for reconsideration of its earlier ruling ordering Gonzales’ reinstatement.

“The Court, voting 14-1, denied the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration on the Court’s decision in these cases dated September 4, 2012 (only insofar as the Court orders the reinstatement of petitioner Gonzales III for the reason that the acts imputed to him do not constitute betrayal of public trust),” the high court’s Public Information Office said.

“On the issue of the lack of cause to dismiss petitioner Gonzales, the Court sustained its previous position, subject to the dissent of one justice. Several Justices have indicated that they will submit separate opinions pending the promulgation of the decisions.”

The Palace ordered Gonzales dismissed in March 2011 for mishandling the case of dismissed policeman Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza, who held hostage a busload of Chinese tourists from Hong Kong during the incident in which eight Hong Kong nationals were killed.

But in Sept. 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and ordered his reinstatement after ruling that the grounds in the findings of the Palace “fall short of the constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust.”

Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales, however, did not allow Gonzales to immediately assume his post, saying the high court ruling was not yet final then.
Gonzales is set to retire next month.

source:  Manila Standard

Oral Arguments @ SC: Dumping DAP

A lot of people tuned in during the oral arguments by the Executive Branch before the Supreme Court last 28 January 2014. The Executive was represented by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Butch Abad and the Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza. It was interesting to know the answers to several questions: Whose idea was DAP? Why was it put together? Who drafted it? What was the impact of enforcing DAP in the bureaucracy? When dod it start? These would have been easy to learn if we had a Freedom on Information Law or even just the Robredo-Disclosure Bill.
There were also public administration principles that were considered and really new ones that were offered such as the “use or lose” principle invoked by the Executive to force the Executive agencies to use their funds. Savings declared as early as June of the fiscal year (this is disastrous, to say the least). Augmenting an item which is not for the Executive Branch (notion of cross border funding, such as Commission on Audit and House of Representatives). Use of mandatory reserves which cannot be used to augment other items. Loose use of such key budgeting principles as “mandatory reserves,” “augmentation fund,“ “final discontinuance,” abandonment” and “re-alignment.”

Interestingly, the whole oral defense of the Executive Branch sets aside the existing process (Budget Call), the role of the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as that of Congress. There was no specificity because the 2010 budget essentially was a budget of the previous administration and that is why they impounded (review of expenses and projects) some funds resulting in a slowdown which thus affected growth. Because of their decision to slow things down, there was negligible growth and the economy contracted. It was not because of the absorptive capacity of the Bureucracy or the DRRM Law as they pointed out. In fact, the Disaster and Risk Reduction and Management was not given the P1-billion budget needed and one of the early budget reforms the Aquino administration did was to remove pre-disaster share of the national with the local government units.

Interestingly, too, the Aquino Administration adopted in FY 2011 zero-based budgeting. If indeed it was a zero-based budgeting, there would have been no slow grind. It would have cured the defect they wanted done. Zero-based budgeting is an approach to planning and decision-making which reverses the working process of traditional budgeting. In traditional incremental budgeting (Historic Budgeting), departmental managers justify only variances versus past years, based on the assumption that the “baseline” is automatically approved. By contrast, in zero-based budgeting, every line item of the budget must be approved, rather than only changes. During the review process, no reference is made to the previous level of expenditure. Zero-based budgeting requires the budget request be re-evaluated thoroughly, starting from the zero-base. This process is independent of whether the total budget or specific line items are increasing or decreasing. So, is zero-based budgeting just lip service or were Abad and Jardeleza just mouthing things to defend the indefensible?

Pointed questions were asked by Justices Lucas Bersamin, Antonio Carpio and Arturo Brion. It was a withering scene where the DBM Secretary and Solicitor General often had stuttering and stammering episodes in answering questions from the Bench. But what probably got the jaded listener to stand up was when the Executive Duo said that DAP is functus officio or moot and academic. And that the Supreme Court need not rule anymore on the instant issue because the Executive had dumped DAP. In fact, the news over the weekend virtually became a distancing strategy, most especially for BSA3.
According to DBM Secretary Abad, it was the President’s idea to have DAP. No quibbling there. And we have a President who personally takes the shot from any and all for his KKK and here before the Bench, Abad dumped his President even while Justice Brion established later that Abad had expertise (cabinet secretary, years as legislators with Abad even volunteering he was chair of Appropriations Committee, DBM Secretary, etc). Even Memo Circular No. 541 was the subject of drilled questionings on intent and statutory construction. The concept of final abandonment by June was an issue that kept on being raised considering that a fiscal year is 12 months and the principle of obligation in budgeting has always been 2 years.

When you hear the DBM Secretary saying that to deal with slow-poked agencies, removal of budget is necessary, it shows the kind of management style they have. Imagine a budget removed from an agency by June of the fiscal year? Incredible! Then again, Abad and Jardaleza crossed the thin line when they said that the use of the power to augment non-existing items is no violation of the Constitutiton. I was shocked!

DAP is also about discretionary power. It’s how one uses savings and justifies its usage. An ordinary mind refers to it as juggling of funds! The Executive duo kept saying there is nothing to resolve since DAP has completed its task. I wonder what that task was since the timing is dubious. It’s as if all these storylines were being produced after the fact.

The post-DAP environment saw the following sections adopted in the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA): Sections 67, 68, 69, 70, and 71 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 10633 outlines the definition and rules in the use and realignment of Savings.

According to Section 68, Savings refer to “portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act (2014 GAA) free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity, or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriation balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriation balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver required for planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.”

The same section also limits augmentation to existing program, activity or project with appropriation in the GAA and prohibits the use of Savings to fund non-existing programs, activities and projects or to appropriations not authorized by the GAA.

The Supreme Court interprets and it should rule on DAP to lay down jurisprudence and guide the Executive and the Legislative Branches. More so, it should protect the taxpayers from patently unconstitutional acts. Not because the program ended means the Supreme Court can’t look into it. The more it should rule for reason and justice.

As a citizen, I recall Humpy Dumpy . . .

source:  Manila Times' Column of MA. LOURDES N. TIQUIA