Dear PAO,
I am now facing a baseless complaint from my neighbor
for defamation before the Lupon of our barangay. I would like to ask the
procedure for changing a member of the Lupon who is biased?
MD
Dear MD,
A Lupon Tagapamayapa is created by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160 otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991”, wherein
Article 387 (b) of the law provides that “there shall be in every
barangay a lupong tagapamayapa”. The lupon is composed of the punong
barangay as chairman and 10 to 20 members. A member of the lupon must be
a person residing or working in the barangay, who is not otherwise
expressly disqualified by law, and possessing integrity, impartiality,
independence of mind, sense of fairness, and reputation for probity
(Section 399, Local Government Code).
The lupon has the following
functions: (a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation
panels provided herein; (b) Meet regularly once a month to provide a
forum for exchange of ideas among its members and the public on matters
relevant to the amicable settlement of disputes, and to enable various
conciliation panel members to share with one another their observations
and experiences in effecting speedy resolution of disputes; and (c)
Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions
as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
It is the Pangkat
Tagapagkasundo, whose members are chosen from the Lupon, that conducts
barangay mediation after efforts for mediation of lupon chairman fails
(Section 410 (b), Local Government Code). The members of the pangkat is
chosen by the parties from the members of the Lupon. If the parties fail
to agree on the pangkat membership, the same shall be determined by
lots drawn by the lupon chairman (Section 405, Local Government Code).
Thus,
if a pangkat tagapagkasundo, who would conduct mediation regarding the
compliant of your neighbor, is not yet constituted, we advise that you
choose the members who have the qualifications as stated by the Local
Government Code to best resolve the issue presented. If a pangkat is
already constituted and it appears that one of the members thereof is
biased, you may move to disqualify him on the said basis.
However,
an affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat is needed to resolve
the said motion to disqualify, which decision shall be final (Section
410 [d], Local Government Code).
We hope that we were able to
answer your queries. Please be reminded that this advice is based solely
on the facts you have narrated and our appreciation of the same. Our
opinion may vary when other facts are changed or elaborated.
source: Manila Times' Column of Atty Persida Acosta
Saturday, July 20, 2013
Tuesday, July 9, 2013
Exigencies justifying warrantless search and seizure
At the height of the December 1989 coup d’etat staged against the
government, the members of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers
of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) bombarded various establishments and
military camps in Metro Manila with their “tora-tora” planes and took
over the Villamor Air Base, the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the
Army Operations Center, the government television station, and the
Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan.
The accused in this case was charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion.
According to the military officers involved, the Intelligence Division of the National Capital Region Defense Command conducted a surveillance of a European automobile sales office along EDSA pursuant to an intelligence report that said establishment was being used as a communication command post by the RAM-SFP.
However, when they neared the establishment, they were attacked and fired upon by a group of men. This resulted in the subsequent raid of the sales office, wherein the military officers discovered and confiscated six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and “Molotov” bombs inside one of the offices belonging to a certain Colonel.
The officer who first entered the building alleged that he saw the accused inside the office of the Colonel holding a C-4 while suspiciously peeping through the door. The accused was arrested and was made to sign an inventory of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team.
The team, however, failed to secure a search warrant prior to the raid. They attributed this failure to the disorderly circumstances at the time, i.e., the attack of the nearby Camp Aguinaldo by rebel forces with the simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the sales office, coupled with the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
In his defense, the accused gave an entirely different version of what transpired. He claimed that he worked as a “boy” for the Colonel and was tasked to guard his office. When the raiding team arrived, he was not in the office but rather in his nipa house, which was adjacent to the building. He was ordered to get out of his house and was made to lie on the ground face down. He averred that he knew nothing about the explosives, which were already there when he was ordered to get up.
The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, one of the issues tackled by the Supreme Court was whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case. Answering in the affirmative, the High Court held -
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested… when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with (People of the Philippines v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, 6 July 1994, J. Regalado).
source: Manila Times' Column of Benchpress
The accused in this case was charged with the crime of illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion.
According to the military officers involved, the Intelligence Division of the National Capital Region Defense Command conducted a surveillance of a European automobile sales office along EDSA pursuant to an intelligence report that said establishment was being used as a communication command post by the RAM-SFP.
However, when they neared the establishment, they were attacked and fired upon by a group of men. This resulted in the subsequent raid of the sales office, wherein the military officers discovered and confiscated six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and “Molotov” bombs inside one of the offices belonging to a certain Colonel.
The officer who first entered the building alleged that he saw the accused inside the office of the Colonel holding a C-4 while suspiciously peeping through the door. The accused was arrested and was made to sign an inventory of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team.
The team, however, failed to secure a search warrant prior to the raid. They attributed this failure to the disorderly circumstances at the time, i.e., the attack of the nearby Camp Aguinaldo by rebel forces with the simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the sales office, coupled with the fact that the courts were consequently closed.
In his defense, the accused gave an entirely different version of what transpired. He claimed that he worked as a “boy” for the Colonel and was tasked to guard his office. When the raiding team arrived, he was not in the office but rather in his nipa house, which was adjacent to the building. He was ordered to get out of his house and was made to lie on the ground face down. He averred that he knew nothing about the explosives, which were already there when he was ordered to get up.
The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, one of the issues tackled by the Supreme Court was whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case. Answering in the affirmative, the High Court held -
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested… when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with (People of the Philippines v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, 6 July 1994, J. Regalado).
source: Manila Times' Column of Benchpress
Saturday, July 6, 2013
Consented warrantless search
An agent from the Anti-Usury Board obtained a search warrant
commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house, or store
of a woman at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer.” The search warrant was issued by a judge based on the affidavit
of the same agent who believed that this woman conducts activities in
violation of the Anti-Usury law and keeps evidence of these activities
in her home and store.
The same day the warrant was issued, the agent went to the store. The woman was not present because she was sick and confined at home. Regardless of this fact, the agent and police officer showed the search warrant to the woman’s bookkeeper and began to search the premises. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized and a receipt issued to the bookkeeper.
Six cases were filed in court for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. Pending decision, the woman demanded several times from the Anti-Usury Board to return all the documents seized. The legality of the search warrant was also questioned. The lower court refused to return the documents seized. While it found the search warrant to be illegal, it upheld the search on the basis that there was a waiver on the right against warrantless searches and seizures.
The Supreme Court (SC) upheld the illegality of the search warrant but ruled that no such waiver or consent was given to warrant a warrantless search. It explained the concept of a consented warrantless searches, one of the exceptions to the rule on unreasonable searches and seizures - [t]he constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied. No express waiver has been made in the case before us . . . It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right . . . Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
The SC also declared that no implied waiver was present under the circumstances -
[F]ailure to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
Lastly, the Court recognized that even though the woman did not immediately demand the return of her documents upon seizure, she demanded their return on four different occassions before and pending criminal action. It held that “in the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did not waive her constitutional right. The delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication” (De Garcia v. Locsin, G.R. No. L-45950, 20 June 1938, J. Laurel).
source: Manila Times' Column of Benchpress
Notes:
The same day the warrant was issued, the agent went to the store. The woman was not present because she was sick and confined at home. Regardless of this fact, the agent and police officer showed the search warrant to the woman’s bookkeeper and began to search the premises. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized and a receipt issued to the bookkeeper.
Six cases were filed in court for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. Pending decision, the woman demanded several times from the Anti-Usury Board to return all the documents seized. The legality of the search warrant was also questioned. The lower court refused to return the documents seized. While it found the search warrant to be illegal, it upheld the search on the basis that there was a waiver on the right against warrantless searches and seizures.
The Supreme Court (SC) upheld the illegality of the search warrant but ruled that no such waiver or consent was given to warrant a warrantless search. It explained the concept of a consented warrantless searches, one of the exceptions to the rule on unreasonable searches and seizures - [t]he constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or implied. No express waiver has been made in the case before us . . . It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right . . . Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
The SC also declared that no implied waiver was present under the circumstances -
[F]ailure to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
Lastly, the Court recognized that even though the woman did not immediately demand the return of her documents upon seizure, she demanded their return on four different occassions before and pending criminal action. It held that “in the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did not waive her constitutional right. The delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by implication” (De Garcia v. Locsin, G.R. No. L-45950, 20 June 1938, J. Laurel).
source: Manila Times' Column of Benchpress
Notes:
- Warrant has to be presented by authority to the person to whom it issued against
- Person needs to personally manifests his waiver or manifest the same through his authorized 3rd party
Friday, July 5, 2013
Natural law as law standard
A TOPIC I’ve oft been asked is on the
proper role of natural law in our constitutional system. As it is, one
dictum goes “that Congress must legislate in accordance with natural law
but the Supreme Court must rule in accordance with the Constitution.”
However, the reality and the way our present Constitution is written
provide significant deviation from that.
It must be emphasized that our constitutional system, even prior to the 1987 Constitution, allows our Supreme Court to overturn laws not merely on the basis that the Congress did not comply with constitutional requirements (i.e., “procedural due process”) but also to inquire as to the inherent “justness” of a law (i.e., “substantive due process”). Due to our experience with martial law in the 1970s, where our Supreme Court had to shy away from ruling on the measures taken by then President Ferdinand Marcos (as almost every act he did, whether morally questionable or not, was done with legal precision), the present Constitution had a new provision written into it: Article VIII, Section 1. Thus, now expressly, the Supreme Court has the power to determine if the acts of Congress (or the president’s) were done with “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has the authority to overturn a law enacted by Congress if the same was “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or if such was enacted in an “arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” The latter indicates a law that is unfair, unjust, or contrary to reason, motivated as it was, for example, by mere “passion.”
Taking that into consideration, is the Supreme Court mandated to use natural law as a standard (alongside and even beyond that of the Constitution) with which to view Congressional enactments? The answer is yes. For two reasons. One is that because natural law is: “an objective standard of right and wrong derived from the use of right reason.” If a law be contrary to natural law, it goes against reason, and an irrational law logically would be an act of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.”
But there’s another and more simple reason: because the Supreme Court itself said so.
This (expressly or impliedly, directly or in allusion to) in ruling after ruling by the Supreme Court, which in a partial listing alone would include: People v. Asas (recognizing the right against forced confessions as part of the natural law); People v. Agbot (recognizing that the natural law forbids killing); Mobile Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Diocares (the element of promise as the basis of contracts as an influence of natural law); Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v. Court of Appeals (estoppel as part of natural law); Yu Con v. Ipil (on natural law in maritime law); In Re Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla (on the prohibition of unjust enrichment in the natural law); Moncado v. El Tribunal del Pueblo y Juan M. Ladaw (statement on the innate human sense of justice); Laurel v. Misa (on the natural law and positive law prohibition of wars of aggression); Ansay v. the board of directors of the National Development Co. (on natural obligations); Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. NAMAWU-MIF (on the natural law basis of certain labor code provisions); De La Llana v. Alba (on the role of natural law in judicial decisions); Marquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (on the natural law basis of property rights); Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corp. (on natural obligations).
Then there are specific cases, where aside from referring to a “higher law” or “rule of reason,” the Supreme Court also touched on the nature of “human dignity”: Estrada v. Escritor; Blooming Mills Employment Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc; Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corp.; Allado v. Diokno; Republic vs Sandiganbayan.
All the foregoing must be read alongside Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, incorporating international law (which has natural law as basis, as even any law student knows) into our constitutional system. Examples of this: the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights; the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; international law doctrines of jus cogens (as well as erga omnes); and the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.
It must be emphasized that when the Supreme Court invokes natural law, it wasn’t referring to any theological or religious concept but rather an acknowledgement that there are indeed objective standards. Even the US Supreme Court referred to natural law.
As revered legal expert Jorge Coquia explains: “One standard that can serve as a guide for courts in resolving concrete cases involving conflicts of the fundamental freedoms of speech, press, property and religion is Natural Law. xxx Positive law needs the enduring critic provided by Natural Law. It must be confronted by objective justice.”
Contact: jemygatdula@yahoo.com. Visit my blog at www.jemygatdula.blogspot.com.
source: Businessworld
It must be emphasized that our constitutional system, even prior to the 1987 Constitution, allows our Supreme Court to overturn laws not merely on the basis that the Congress did not comply with constitutional requirements (i.e., “procedural due process”) but also to inquire as to the inherent “justness” of a law (i.e., “substantive due process”). Due to our experience with martial law in the 1970s, where our Supreme Court had to shy away from ruling on the measures taken by then President Ferdinand Marcos (as almost every act he did, whether morally questionable or not, was done with legal precision), the present Constitution had a new provision written into it: Article VIII, Section 1. Thus, now expressly, the Supreme Court has the power to determine if the acts of Congress (or the president’s) were done with “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.”
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has the authority to overturn a law enacted by Congress if the same was “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or if such was enacted in an “arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” The latter indicates a law that is unfair, unjust, or contrary to reason, motivated as it was, for example, by mere “passion.”
Taking that into consideration, is the Supreme Court mandated to use natural law as a standard (alongside and even beyond that of the Constitution) with which to view Congressional enactments? The answer is yes. For two reasons. One is that because natural law is: “an objective standard of right and wrong derived from the use of right reason.” If a law be contrary to natural law, it goes against reason, and an irrational law logically would be an act of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.”
But there’s another and more simple reason: because the Supreme Court itself said so.
This (expressly or impliedly, directly or in allusion to) in ruling after ruling by the Supreme Court, which in a partial listing alone would include: People v. Asas (recognizing the right against forced confessions as part of the natural law); People v. Agbot (recognizing that the natural law forbids killing); Mobile Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Diocares (the element of promise as the basis of contracts as an influence of natural law); Manila Memorial Park Cemetery v. Court of Appeals (estoppel as part of natural law); Yu Con v. Ipil (on natural law in maritime law); In Re Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla (on the prohibition of unjust enrichment in the natural law); Moncado v. El Tribunal del Pueblo y Juan M. Ladaw (statement on the innate human sense of justice); Laurel v. Misa (on the natural law and positive law prohibition of wars of aggression); Ansay v. the board of directors of the National Development Co. (on natural obligations); Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. NAMAWU-MIF (on the natural law basis of certain labor code provisions); De La Llana v. Alba (on the role of natural law in judicial decisions); Marquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (on the natural law basis of property rights); Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corp. (on natural obligations).
Then there are specific cases, where aside from referring to a “higher law” or “rule of reason,” the Supreme Court also touched on the nature of “human dignity”: Estrada v. Escritor; Blooming Mills Employment Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc; Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corp.; Allado v. Diokno; Republic vs Sandiganbayan.
All the foregoing must be read alongside Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, incorporating international law (which has natural law as basis, as even any law student knows) into our constitutional system. Examples of this: the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights; the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; international law doctrines of jus cogens (as well as erga omnes); and the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.
It must be emphasized that when the Supreme Court invokes natural law, it wasn’t referring to any theological or religious concept but rather an acknowledgement that there are indeed objective standards. Even the US Supreme Court referred to natural law.
As revered legal expert Jorge Coquia explains: “One standard that can serve as a guide for courts in resolving concrete cases involving conflicts of the fundamental freedoms of speech, press, property and religion is Natural Law. xxx Positive law needs the enduring critic provided by Natural Law. It must be confronted by objective justice.”
Contact: jemygatdula@yahoo.com. Visit my blog at www.jemygatdula.blogspot.com.
source: Businessworld
Monday, July 1, 2013
Plain view doctrine in warrantless searches and seizures
One late afternoon in a small barangay of Mendez, Cavite, five police
officers were on routine patrol duty when they heard the sound of
successive gunshots in the vicinity and found a man firing a gun into
the air. The man saw the patrol and immediately ran away to a nearby
house where the police officers pursued him. They found two (2) slightly
inebriated individuals drinking on the porch of the house. The
inebriated individuals informed the police men that the man they were
chasing had already escaped through the window of the house.
One of the police men, however, observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of one of the men who later on admitted he was carrying a .38 caliber revolver. Moreover, he did not have a valid license to carry the firearm, which led to the confiscation of his revolver. The policeman asked the owner of the house if he could search the house for the man firing the gun, and the owner consented. In the sala, they found more firearms as well as other paraphernalia used in the repair and manufacture of firearms. Both the owner of the house and the individual carrying the firearm were indicted for illegal possession of firearms under Sec. 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The two accused denied owning or possessing any of the confiscated firearms. They further alleged that the firearms and gun paraphernalia were illegally seized in violation of their constitutional rights. The trial court found both men guilty.
Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are hereby sentenced to serve the penalty provided for under Sec. 1 thereof. The full period of their preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the aforementioned penalty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s decision ruling that the search that led to the seizure of the firearm and gunfire paraphernalia was a reasonable search based on the plain view doctrine. Citing Harris v. U.S. and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the plain view doctrine provides that “objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence” -
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.
The Court reminded that Sec. 2, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution, only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and this rule is subject to several exceptions.
For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 11 December 1992, J. Padilla).
source: Manila Times' Column of Benchpress
One of the police men, however, observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of one of the men who later on admitted he was carrying a .38 caliber revolver. Moreover, he did not have a valid license to carry the firearm, which led to the confiscation of his revolver. The policeman asked the owner of the house if he could search the house for the man firing the gun, and the owner consented. In the sala, they found more firearms as well as other paraphernalia used in the repair and manufacture of firearms. Both the owner of the house and the individual carrying the firearm were indicted for illegal possession of firearms under Sec. 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The two accused denied owning or possessing any of the confiscated firearms. They further alleged that the firearms and gun paraphernalia were illegally seized in violation of their constitutional rights. The trial court found both men guilty.
Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D. No. 1866, accused Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are hereby sentenced to serve the penalty provided for under Sec. 1 thereof. The full period of their preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the aforementioned penalty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s decision ruling that the search that led to the seizure of the firearm and gunfire paraphernalia was a reasonable search based on the plain view doctrine. Citing Harris v. U.S. and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the plain view doctrine provides that “objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence” -
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.
The Court reminded that Sec. 2, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution, only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and this rule is subject to several exceptions.
For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Evaristo, G.R. No. 93828, 11 December 1992, J. Padilla).
source: Manila Times' Column of Benchpress
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)